Hizbullah checked in Lebanon

[frigidmagi]

economist

Lebanon's new government will be friendly to the West

Fears that the Lebanese general election would result in a parliament dominated by the March 8th bloc led by Hizbullah, the Iranian-backed Shia military-political group, have proved to be misplaced. The March 14th movement, led by Saad al-Hariri and strongly endorsed by the Obama administration, won a convincing victory, largely thanks to the failure of Hizbullah's Christian ally, Michel Aoun, to deliver as many seats as he had hoped. However, electoral defeat will not stop Hizbullah and Mr Aoun from asserting their demand for veto powers over government decisions.

Mr Hariri's March 14th movement had won the previous election in 2005 by capitalising on the strong support it received following the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country after the assassination of his father, Rafiq, in February that year. However, March 14th found it increasingly hard to govern effectively in the face of extra-parliamentary opposition from Hizbullah and Mr Aoun. This culminated in a brief militia takeover of central Beirut on May 7th last year, after the government tried to close down Hizbullah's military telecoms system. The crisis was resolved, with Qatari mediation, with an agreement in Doha to give the opposition a "blocking third" of seats in the cabinet, following the election of Michel Suleiman as president. Under Lebanon's constitution, decisions of "national importance" can only be passed if approved by at least two-thirds of the cabinet, so any group with more than one-third of the cabinet seats has the power to veto important legislation. The Doha agreement also included provision for electoral reform, based largely on demands from Mr Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).

After the humiliation of the Doha agreement, March 14th faced an uphill battle as it started campaigning for the parliamentary election, and polls suggested that the March 8th alliance of Hizbullah, the FPM and other Shia and Christian forces had a chance of securing a slender majority. However, the core vote of March 14th, particularly among the Sunnis and the Druze, held firm, and although Mr Aoun managed to match his 2005 performance, he was unable to improve on it. March 14th secured its victory with strong results in key marginal constituencies, notably Zahle (a majority Greek Catholic town in the east), Koura (north of Beirut) and in Christian parts of Beirut itself. According to the Interior Ministry, March 14th secured 68 seats, with 57 going to March 8th and the remaining three to independents (all of them inclined towards March 14th). The turnout was about 55%, compared with 46% in 2005. The principal complaints related to the heavy spending of March 14th, including the alleged provision of free air tickets for expatriates to enable them to vote in their constituencies.
Nasrallah's turn-off

March 14th may have benefited from an intimation of support from the Maronite patriarch, Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, shortly before the election, in the form of remarks about unspecified threats to Lebanon's Arab identity, widely seen as a reference to the Iranian-backed March 8th alliance. The US administration also made clear that it was concerned not to see a Hizbullah-led bloc in the majority in parliament, and Mr Hariri's campaign received the effective endorsement of the US vice president, Joe Biden, and the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, both of whom have visited Beirut in the last few weeks. Various US officials had said military assistance to Lebanon would be reviewed after the election, and March 14th politicians played up the risk that a March 8th win could leave Lebanon isolated from its European and Arab allies, with detrimental economic effects. The rhetoric of the Hizbullah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, could well have had a negative impact on Mr Aoun's campaign. Mr Nasrallah held a rally on May 7th to mark last year's crisis in Beirut, describing its outcome as a "glorious victory for the resistance". Mr Nasrallah also said that if the election resulted in the US withdrawing support from the Lebanese army, Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, "would not be miserly". This glorification of the militia assault on central Beirut and the highlighting of Hizbullah's close ties to Iran would have made many Christian voters think twice before casting their vote for March 8th.
On the block

The election has yielded a parliament that is broadly similar in make-up to that of 2005. Both Mr Hariri and the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, have made clear that they want to have a government representing most parties in Lebanon, but they have rejected the notion of restoring the "blocking third" that was agreed in Qatar. March 14th will first have to decide on who to put forward as the prime minister designate. Since 2005 the post has been held by Fouad Siniora, a close associate of the late Mr Hariri and a former finance minister. Mr Siniora had a torrid time coping with the opposition's efforts to subvert his governments, and it is not clear that he has any desire to repeat this experience. Mr Hariri himself could step up, but he has thus far preferred to avoid taking an executive role. Other options within March 14th might include Mohammed Safadi, a businessman who was economy minister in the outgoing government. It has also been suggested that Mr Hariori could seek to win the opposition's co-operation by putting forward a non-March 14th figure, such as Najib Mikati, a businessman who has served as prime minister in the past and who has good relations with the Syrian government.

The margin of victory for March 14th suggests that it will be hard for the opposition to secure its blocking third. There is a possibility that March 8th could once again take to the streets in order to obtain veto power, but this seems unlikely, as the May 2008 events cost the movement political capital; it gained veto power in the short term but ultimately lost votes. It therefore appears that if March 8th is to participate in government it will have to make do with a formula whereby a minister (or ministers) nominated directly by the president will hold the casting vote in contested cabinet decisions.

Such an arrangement may work for a while, but it would undoubtedly break down were the government to seek to deal with the highly sensitive issue of Hizbullah's independent military forces. It is also questionable whether Mr Aoun will be ready to accept a relatively junior role in the new government. The new government should have a little more room for manoeuvre on policymaking if the opposition no longer has a veto. Yet the general fragility of the Lebanese political system suggests that, like its predecessor, the new government will probably be unable—or unwilling—to take decisions on particularly contentious issues like Hizbullah's arms, the status of the Palestinian refugees in the country, or serious efforts at reforming the massive public sector.
Iran next

Another critical aspect of the Lebanese election is its relation to the Iranian presidential election, which takes place on June 12th. The setback for Hizbullah, Iran's strongest ally in the Arab world, could well work in favour of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the reformist challenger to the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, by showing that radical anti-US forces can be beaten. However, it could also persuade Mr Khamenei and the Iranian security establishment that they need to pull out all the stops to ensure that their radical agenda is preserved through Mr Ahmadinejad winning a second term.

We can hope.